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Litigating BP's Contribution Claims
in Publicly Subsidized Courts: Should
Contracting Parties Pay Their Own

Way?
Bruce L. Hay
ChristopherRendall-Jackson
David Rosenberg
64 Vand. L. Rev. 1919 (2011)
In this Article, we focus on an important problem involving
mass-accident cases that was highlighted by the Deepwater Horizon
litigation: overuse of courts to enforce contribution claims. These
claims seek to shift incurred or expected liability and damages
between the business and governmental entities that participatedin
the activity that gave rise to the mass-accident risk. Participantsin
such ventures generally have the option to determine by contract
beforehand whether to subject themselves to contribution claims
and, if so, whether such claims will be resolved by a publicly funded
court or by a privately funded process, such as arbitration.Because
the parties prosecuting and defending against contribution claims
can consume judicial resources largely free of charge, it is likely they
will choose to litigate in court to a greater extent than is socially
desirable. We consider whether courts can effectively realign the
parties' incentives by chargingthem for the cost of using the judicial
process. Taking account of the public good of judicial precedentmaking, we advance a user-fee design that allows courts to waive the
fee in whole or in part for contribution claims that present
substantial questions of law. Analysis of the proposal's application
is extended generally to commercial contract disputes. Our central
conclusion is that an appropriately designed user fee can effectively
abate the problem of overuse without adversely affecting the
functioning of the civil liability system.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In this Article, we focus on an important problem with massaccident cases, a problem highlighted by the Deepwater Horizon
litigation: overuse of courts to enforce contribution claims. These
claims seek to allocate liability among the business and governmental
entities that contractually participated in the risky venture. 1 Joint
and several liability with provision for contribution, for example,
enables plaintiffs asserting primary claims to recover all proven
damages from a single "deep-pocket" defendant, regardless of that
defendant's own share of legal responsibility for the harm, and then
authorizes the defendant to sue other joint venturers to recoup
payments in excess of its proportionate share of liability. 2 The key
point for our purposes is that contribution claims are entirely
creatures of the joint venturers' own making. Through a contract that
establishes the terms of their joint venture relationship ("predispute
contract"), the parties can exercise complete control over whether to
subject themselves to contribution claims, and, if so, whether to
resolve the claims by publicly funded courts or by a privately funded
alternative, such as arbitration.

1. In pursuing this inquiry, we broadly define "contribution claims" to include all causes of
action-whether created by common law, statute, or contract-seeking to shift or allocate
incurred or expected damages and related litigation costs among joint venturers. We are not
concerned with the technical classification of these actions as claims for contribution, indemnity,
setoff, or otherwise.
2.

See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABIuTY § C18 (2000)

(allowing a party to seek reallocation for joint and several liability damages). For historical and
doctrinal overview of rules of joint and several liability and related provisions for contribution,
see Frank J. Vandall, A Critique of the Restatement (Third), Apportionment as it Affects Joint
and Several Liability, 49 EMORY L.J. 565, 565-71 (2000) (discussing the history of joint and
several liability); for economic analysis of various allocation rules, see A. Mitchell Polinsky &
Steven Shavell, Contribution and Claim Reduction Among Antitrust Defendants: An Economic
Analysis, 33 STAN. L. REV. 447, 448-50 (1981) (providing an economic analysis of three different
contribution rules). We will not explore the variations and details in the rules governing
adjudication of contribution claims because parsing and analyzing their differences would
complicate, but not change, the substance of our argument.
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Because the parties prosecuting and defending against
contribution claims can consume judicial resources largely free of
charge, it is likely they will choose to litigate in court to a greater
extent than is socially desirable. The specific, socially detrimental
result of such distorted litigation incentives is delayed resolution of
cases that merit greater priority in gaining access to public judicial
resources. Generally, these are cases in which the claimants lacked
predispute contractual means to control risk and provide for
nonjudicial alternatives, and hence the principal social benefits of
deterrence and compensation depend on court-enforced civil liability.
We argue that courts can effectively correct the contracting
parties' incentives by charging them for the cost of using the judicial
process. Requiring contracting parties to pay their way in court would
free up judicial resources to increase the average level of benefits from
adjudication. Such a user fee, as we show, can be extended to almost
all commercial-contract cases.
A. ContributionClaims in the Deepwater Horizon Litigation
The problem of overuse of courts was brought into sharp relief
by the sheer scale of the Deepwater Horizon disaster and the number
of potentially responsible parties. The devastation wreaked by the
Deepwater Horizon disaster in the Gulf of Mexico and along the Gulf
Coast underscores the risk of mass catastrophic harm that shadows
virtually all large-scale production. 3 The Deepwater Horizon project
also highlights that large-scale production is inevitably a "joint
venture" comprised of an intricate combination of private and public
entities that are organized and operated through a network of
4
contracts and other agreements.
Two critical features of the Deepwater Horizon disaster, the
extensive injuries sustained by victims of the disaster and the
comprehensive contractual relationship among the joint venturers,
will characterize the complex civil litigation that invariably follows
3.

For an analysis of the causes and effects of the Deepwater Horizon disaster, see BP,

DEEPWATER HORIZON ACcDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT 28 (2010), available at http://www.bp.
com/.liveassets/bpjinternet/globalbp/globalbpkenglishincidentresponse/STAGINGlocalass
ets/downloads-pdfs/Deepwater_Horizon.AccidentInvestigationReport.pdf.
4. See, e.g., id. at 11 (noting that a "complex and interlinked series of mechanical failures,
human judgments, engineering design, operational implementation and team interfaces"
permitted the accident to occur and that "[m]ultiple companies, work teams and circumstances
were involved over time"); David M. Uhlmann, After the Spill is Gone: The Gulf of Mexico,
Environmental Crime, and the Criminal Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1413, 1420-21 (2011)
(discussing the various private and government entities involved with the Deepwater Horizon
venture).
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mass accidents. 5 Mass-accident litigation may span decades and
consume hundreds of millions of dollars in legal resources. 6 In
addition, the litigation will consume massive amounts of judicial
resources as courts resolve not only plaintiffs' primary personal-injury
and property-damage claims against the named defendants, but also
secondary claims for contribution. For example, exactly one year after
the Deepwater Horizon disaster, many of the principal joint venturers
in the project filed a slew of accusatory contribution claims against
each other. These claims seek to shift all or at least part of the liability
7
for the blowout from the movant to one or more of the other parties.
B. Costs and Benefits of Contribution Claims
Resolving these contribution claims may take more publicly
subsidized judicial time and effort than the underlying primary
claims. Generally, the court must determine not only whether the
party sued for contribution is liable for the accident but also the
proportionate degree to which its conduct causally enhanced the risk
and harm at issue. For example, in its third-party complaint against
Halliburton Energy Services, BP seeks to recover any damages that it
may have to pay plaintiffs in the underlying action. BP argues that
both Halliburton's negligent cement work on the well and its
fraudulent concealment of problems with the well's performance
5.
Most of the civil claims arising from the Deepwater Horizon mass accident have been
consolidated by the Multidistrict Litigation Panel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2006). See In re
Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, 731 F. Supp.
2d 1352, 1356 (J.P.M.L. 2010) (consolidating and transferring seventy-seven related actions to
the Eastern District of Louisiana).
6.
The litigation arising out of the 1989 Exxon Valdez accident is illustrative. See, e.g.,
William A. Lovett, Exxon Valdez, Punitive Damages, and Tort Reform, 38 TORT TRIAL & INS.
PRAC. LJ. 1071, 1087 (2003) (observing that reported and estimated expenses of plaintiffs and
defendants in the 1994 trial exceeded $200 million); see also William Yardley, 22 Years Later, the
Exxon Valdez Case is Back in Court, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2011, at A14 (illustrating the Exxon
Valdez litigation continuing in 2011). The Exxon Valdez case, however, comes nowhere near
matching the time and expense of the more than forty years of asbestos litigation in this country.
For an accounting of the asbestos litigation cost, see STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., RAND INST. FOR
CIVIL JUsTIcE, ASBESTOS LITIGATION (2005).
7.
See, e.g, BP's Cross Complaint and Third-Party Complaint Against Halliburton at 2, In
re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, No. 1002179 (E.D. La. Apr. 20, 2011), 2011 U.S. Dist. Ct. Pleadings LEXIS 351 (illustrating the nature
of the contribution claims). The array of cross, counter, and third-party claims is extensive and
complicated. See, e.g., BP Parties' Countercomplaint, Cross Complaint and Third-Party
Complaint Against Transocean and Claim in Limitation at 2, In re Oil Spill, 2011 U.S. Dist. Ct.
Pleadings LEXIS 351. In addition, the BP subsidiary BP Exploration & Production filed similar
contribution claims against Transocean, Cameron, and Halliburton. BPXP's Cross Claim and
Third-Party Complaint Against Transocean at 1, In re Oil Spill, 2011 U.S. Dist. Ct. Pleadings
LEXIS 349.
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caused or contributed to the Deepwater Horizon accident.8 Moreover,
contribution claims greatly multiply the judicial resources absorbed by
a mass-accident case by requiring courts to adjudicate questions
mooted by settlement in the underlying litigation. 9 They also confront
courts with additional questions not at issue in the underlying
litigation, such as substantive (and related choice of law) issues
concerning the extent to which an insolvent joint venturer's share of
damages should be reallocated to solvent parties. 10
These costs must be assessed in light of potential social
benefits from court enforcement of contribution claims. Judicial
enforcement of contribution claims can usefully promote deterrence
objectives by allocating liability to the parties best situated to take
optimal precautions against harm.'1 Along with its benefits of
administrative efficiency, application of collective liability rules such
as joint and several liability may distort the parties' incentives to
invest in reducing accident risk to the socially appropriate level. If a
party expects to ultimately bear disproportionate liability, it may well
be overdeterred, spending too much on safety precautions and being
too cautious about entering into risky but socially desirable joint
ventures. At the same time, a party anticipating relief from bearing its
share of the expected liability will be underdeterred, spending too
little on precautions and, perhaps, entering into hazardous ventures
that, from society's point of view, it should avoid.1 2 In this way,

8.
BP's Cross Complaint and Third-Party Complaint against Halliburton at 34-40, In re
Oil Spill, 2011 U.S. Dist. Ct. Pleadings LEXIS 351.
9.
See Eric D. Suben, The Effect of Settlement on Nonsettling Joint Tortfeasors in Maritime
Law, 17 TUL. MAR. L.J. 301, 302 (1993) (relating that some courts in maritime actions would
allow contribution claims in separate actions after trial where the settling defendant's degree of
fault was determined).
10. See, e.g., Edward S. Johnson & Cindy T. Matherne, Statutory and Contractual
Indemnification and Forum Selection, Including the Oil Patch, 24 TUL. MAR. L.J. 85, 88-98
(1999) (discussing choice-of-law provisions in service contracts related to the oil industry in the
Gulf of Mexico). On apportionment of insolvent defendant's share, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § C21 (2000) (providing rules for reallocation of damages
among solvent parties); William M. Landes, Insolvency and Joint Torts: A Comment, 19 J. LEGAL
STUD. 679, 679-80 (1990) (evaluating the efficiency of negligence and strict liability in cases of
joint tort defendant insolvency).
11. See David Rosenberg, Joint and Several Liability for Toxic Torts, 15 J. HAZARDOUS
MATERIALS 219, 225 (1987). See generally Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 2. In this Article, we
use the term "deterrence" to encompass all applications of civil liability that create incentives for
individuals and institutions to obey the law, including incentives to take reasonable precautions
against accident and to comply with rules governing enforcement of contracts.
12. Of course, participants in a joint venture may shun a party that is expected to bear less
than its proportionate share of anticipated liability. One purpose of contribution agreements is to
facilitate joint undertakings among parties who might otherwise be excluded from or reluctant to
join the venture.
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enforcing contribution claims (including contractual allocations of
liability) encourages the formation of socially desirable joint ventures,
discourages undesirable ones, and promotes optimal care by the
participants in those that are formed.
However, there is an unnecessary social cost associated with
public courts resolving contribution claims brought by defendants
against other joint venturers. The basic problem lies in the public
subsidy for the use of courts. Although litigation in the court system
obviously is not free to the parties, the public still bears a substantial
amount of the costs of adjudication. 13 Foremost among these costs is
the time that public officers devote to adjudication-time that the
parties do not pay for and that the officials could have spent on other
cases if the parties had opted for a private alternative. Yet if they
resort to private alternatives, such as arbitration, or nonlitigation
options, like liquidated damages or adjustment of basic contract price
and performance terms, the parties must pay for the contract
negotiations, and if contribution or other disputes arise, for arbitrators
to resolve them. 14 This divergence-free provision of public
decisionmakers but not of their private counterparts-distorts the
incentives of joint venturers, leading them to make socially excessive
15
use of the courts to resolve contribution claims.
Our claim is that eliminating the public subsidy for
adjudicating contribution claims would optimize the scale and scope of
contracting parties' predispute behavior. Charging contracting parties
a user fee equal to the public costs of adjudication would largely align
the private and social incentives to use publicly funded courts instead
of privately funded alternatives.

13. Litigants remit only a pittance of the court and other social costs generated by the
adjudication of their cases. The current filing fee for federal district courts is set by statute at
$350 for civil claims (other than filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which is $5). 28
U.S.C. § 1914(a) (2006).
14. For an example of the fees charged for arbitration, see AAA Pre-filing Facts, AM. ARB.
ASS'N, httpJ/www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=29297 (last visited Sept. 3, 2011) (listing of fees for
arbitration). Unless otherwise specified, references to contracting parties' choice between courts
and arbitration include nonlitigation alternatives, such as liquidated damages and price
adjustments.
15. See Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use (or Not Use)
Arbitration Clauses?, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL 433, 435-36 (2010) (arguing that the public
subsidy for adjudication often leads parties to choose court instead of arbitration); William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235, 250 (1979)
(arguing that adjudication may have a competitive advantage over arbitration because courts are
publicly funded).
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C. User-Fee Proposal
We propose that courts charge contracting parties a fee to cover
the expenditure of judicial resources incurred by society to adjudicate
their contribution claims. Taking account of the public good of judicial
precedent making, the proposed user fee would be subject to an offset
for costs attributable to the adjudication of substantial legal questions.
Because the basic aim of the user fee is to correct the incentives of
contracting parties in making predispute contracts, our proposal can
readily apply to all commercial-contract cases. Dampening incentives
to overuse judicial resources would free courts to enforce civil liability
in the balance of cases and thereby increase the resulting average
level of deterrence and compensation benefits.
To illustrate, assume that there are two hundred claims
pending on a court's docket-one hundred commercial-contract cases
and one hundred other cases-the potential deterrence benefits of
which require court-enforced civil liability. Assume further the court
can adjudicate ten cases a year and randomly selects cases for
adjudication. Finally, assume that the parties in all of the commercialcontract cases would prefer adjudication if it was publicly subsidized
but would prefer arbitration if courts charged a user fee. Under these
conditions, with all two hundred claims vying for access in a publicly
subsidized system, each case has a five percent chance of being
adjudicated within the year. In contrast, if the user fee drives the one
hundred commercial-contract cases into arbitration (or some other
nonjudicial alternative), then the chance of the one hundred other
types of cases being adjudicated within the year jumps to ten percent.
Thus, the social benefit produced by the user fee results both from
minimizing the total cost of resolving disputes in commercial-contract
cases and from reducing the average delay cost and consequent loss of
deterrent effect in other types of cases.
To focus the analysis, we consider only commercial-contracting
parties and the claims that arise from their joint undertaking. The
proposal is not applicable to claims that involve noncommercial
contracts or noncontracting parties. 16 Nor does it apply to claims
arising under regulatory regimes in which courts or administrative
authorities override or dictate the terms of commercial contracts. 17 We
16. See, e.g., Am. Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 578 P.2d 899, 899 (Cal. 1978)
(involving a contribution claim against multiple noncontracting tortfeasors).
17. For discussion of the complementary roles of contract (markets) and regulation (e.g.,
torts) in the socially appropriate management of risk, see CHARLES FRIED & DAVID ROSENBERG,
MAKING TORT LAW: WHAT SHOULD BE DONE AND WHO SHOULD DO IT 98-100 (2003); EDITH
STOKEY & RICHARD ZECKHAUSER, A PRIMER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS 291-329 (1978).

1926

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:6:1919

also put aside the independent deterrence argument for charging a
user fee in contribution or other contract cases to compel
internalization by tortfeasors of the total social cost of accidents.,,
Beyond eliminating the public subsidy, the proposal does not
significantly affect application of common law, statutory provisions, or
administrative rules that determine the legal enforceability of
contracts and the process for resolving contract disputes in and out of
court. 19
D. Related Literature
Economic and policy-oriented legal commentators have
addressed the subject of publically subsidized courts as well as the
possibility of charging a user fee to correct the divergence between
private and social incentives to litigate. 20 Our Article adds to this
literature in both of these areas. First, it examines in greater detail
the social costs of publicly subsidizing the judicial resolution of
contribution claims and commercial-contract cases. The costs of
publicly subsidized adjudication, we contend, result from the delayed

18. See Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the Social
Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575, 588 (1997) (arguing that tortfeasors
should pay for the total social cost of accidents, including the expense born by plaintiffs and
courts to determine liability).
19. Thus, for example, our proposal assumes the background rules regarding the
enforceability of indemnity agreements between joint tortfeasors. See, e.g., Louisiana Oilfield
Anti-Indemnity Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2780 (2005) (stating that such indemnity
agreements are void when pertaining to oil, gas, water, or drilling for certain minerals); Texas
Oilfield Anti-Indemnity Act, TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 127.001-127.007 (West 1999)
(similarly stating such agreements void as a matter of public policy). Both commentators and
courts have suggested that state anti-indemnity statutes have led to confusion, increased
litigation, and wasted expense of creating contractual circumventions of these statutes. See, e.g.,
Julia M. Adams & Karen K. Milhollin, Indemnity on the Outer Continental Shelf-A Practical
Primer,27 TUL. MAR. L.J. 43, 43 (2002); Larissa Sanchez, Chartingthe Chaotic Offshore Waters:
The Validity of Contractual Indemnity Provisions Pertainingto Injuries Sustained Offshore, 31
TUL. MAR. L.J. 177, 177, 189 (2006).
20. For an analysis of the current state of publicly financed adjudication and an argument
that parties should generally pay court usage costs, see Brendan S. Maher, The Civil Judicial
Subsidy, 85 IND. L.J. 1527, 1527 (2010). On the wider problem of aligning private and social
incentives in the face of litigation costs (of which scarce judicial resources are only one
component) and justification for social intervention where there is excessive private incentive to
use the legal system, see Shavell, supra note 18, at 575. On possible levies for the use of court
systems, see RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 195-204
(1985) (suggesting a user fee to address court overcrowding); Rex E. Lee, The American Courts as
Public Goods: Who Should Pay the Costs of Litigation?, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 267, 272, 274 (1985)
(suggesting a user fee for litigants and questioning whether there should be exceptions for the
indigent or civil rights claims); Steven Shavell, On the Design of the Appeals Process: The
Optimal Use of DiscretionaryReview Versus Direct Appeal, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 63, 77-81, 95
(2010) (suggesting a user fee for certain appeals).
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resolution of other claims, with resulting harm to the deterrent and
other goals of the substantive law in those cases. Eliminating the
subsidy for commercial-contract cases would increase the average
chance of the other civil cases being adjudicated, and thus the average
level of deterrence and other benefits from adjudication.
Second, the Article takes up the problem of designing a fee
structure that addresses both the aim of correcting the private
dispute-resolution incentives we have noted and the aim of producing
the public good of legal precedents. We acknowledge the tension
between these goals: one generally favors compelling parties to
internalize the costs of the public judicial resources they consume
while the other generally favors subsidizing them to pursue the
creation of judicial precedents that benefit others. Our analysis seeks
to identify an appropriate trade-off between these objectives.
E. Organizationof the Article
In Part II, we examine the incentives created by the public
subsidy for adjudication in relation to the predispute choice of
contracting parties to resolve potential contribution disputes in court
rather than by arbitration or some other privately funded alternative.
Our argument is not that the nonjudicial means are superior; it is
simply that the presence of a subsidy for public adjudication motivates
the contracting parties to overuse courts. In Part III, we assess the
social costs of such overuse. Our analysis not only takes into account
the unnecessary consumption of scarce and valuable judicial
resources; it also explains the adverse effects of resulting court
congestion and delay on the level of deterrence and other benefits
produced by adjudicating cases that do not arise from commercial
contracts. We emphasize the negative consequences of delay on the
time value of litigation, particularly for plaintiffs with high discount
rates. This translates into inappropriately low recoveries and
correspondingly lower levels of deterrence. In Part IV, we sketch the
design of a user fee for judicial resolution of contribution claims,
coupled with a calibrated offset for cases that generate legal
precedents of value to others. In Part V, we extend the analysis to
consider the application of the proposed user fee generally to
commercial-contract cases. Part VI concludes with further comments
on the scope and mechanics of our proposal.
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II. CONTRIBUTION CASES AND THE OVERUSE OF COURTS

A. The General Theory of Litigation Incentives
To introduce our subject, we begin with a brief discussion of the
theoretical explanation of parties' motives to bring their dispute to
court. 21 The theory focuses on the divergence between the private and
social incentives to pursue litigation; that is, the difference between
lawsuits that generate net social gains versus those that profit a given
party while yielding overall social losses. The "externalized" costs
generated by each party include those incurred by the opposing party
in response, 22 as well as the resources expended by the public court
system. Because a party can shift the costs of its litigation decisions
onto others, cases that do not belong in court may wind up there. By
that same token, because the parties do not capture the full social
benefit of their decisions, particularly the deterrent effect on others,
cases may stay out of court that should not.
A simple example illustrates the problem. Suppose that the
amount in controversy in a given case is $10,000 and that going to
court costs each party $9,000. Assuming that the parties fail to settle
beforehand, that the plaintiff will file suit, and that the defendant will
defend, all parties will have jointly spent more than the matter is
worth to them. Add to this the public costs of adjudicating the matter,
and the litigation seems even more wasteful. Assume, for example,
that it costs the public another $9,000 to adjudicate the case. At the
end of the case, $27,000 will have been spent in a battle over $10,000.
The total costs exceed either party's possible gain from the litigation,
yet from an ex ante perspective both parties believe that the litigation
23
is worthwhile because most of the cost is borne by someone else.

21. Here we draw upon the analysis developed in Steven Shavell, The Social Versus the
Private Incentive to Bring Suit in a Costly Legal System, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 333, 333 (1982), and
subsequently extended and refined in Shavell, supra note 18, at 575, and Louis Kaplow, The
Value of Accuracy in Adjudication:An Economic Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 307, 307 (1994). A
summary of this work, with references, can be found at A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell,
Economic Analysis of Law, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (2d ed. 2008). For
recognition of the diverging private and public interests to use the civil liability system in the
context of mass tort litigation, see David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure
Cases: A Public Law' Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REv. 849, 900 (1984) (pointing out
that the deterrence benefit of litigation is a "public good" that plaintiff attorneys lack a profit
motive to produce).
22. In general, each party bears roughly half of the joint litigation expenditures. See
TILLINGHAST-TOWERS PERRIN, U.S. TORT COSTS: 2002 UPDATE-TRENDS AND FINDINGS ON THE
COSTS OF THE U.S. TORT SYSTEM 17 (2003).

23. We emphasize the assumption that the parties have failed to settle the matter out of
court. It is well known that private litigation costs exert strong pressure on parties to settle and
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Of course, this picture is incomplete because it ignores the
possible social benefits of the litigation. The social cost of litigation
may indeed be outweighed by the social benefit, in particular, the
deterrence effect of sanctions on third parties to the lawsuit. In the
above example, a lawsuit would be socially desirable despite its cost if
the award led other prospective defendants to refrain from engaging
in legally sanctionable conduct. If, say, the $27,000 expenditure in this
case prevented each of ten prospective injurers from causing $10,000
of harm in the future, the litigation would be well worth it from a
social point of view. However, because outsiders to the litigation reap
the deterrence benefits, the parties to the present case have no
incentive to consider it. So, depending on the balance of private payoff
and cost, the present parties will pursue litigation that yields no net
deterrence benefit or forgo litigation that would produce significant
24
social value.
B. ContributionCases
Applying the general theory to contribution cases suggests that
the private incentive to go to court is generally excessive. Contribution
claims produce no significant deterrence benefit; that is, these
lawsuits are not needed to create incentives for the contracting parties
or for third parties embarking on other joint ventures to take
precautions against harming each other and to otherwise obey the
law. Consequently, to the extent that the public subsidy for
adjudication motivates the parties to litigate in court rather than in
arbitration, the resulting suit imposes a net social cost.
Contracting parties internalize the expense that a decision to
sue generates for the opposing party. Consistent with their overall
interest in minimizing the total private costs of their venture, the
parties will agree upon predispute terms that efficiently reduce their
create a high entry barrier that keeps the vast majority of disputes out of court. Nonetheless,
many thousands of cases fail to settle and wind up in court each year. Moreover, the prospect of
bearing litigation cost will alter the substance of settlements as well as the motivation to settle.
24. Theorists have observed that this analysis applies straightforwardly to the use of
alternatives to litigation. Steven Shavell, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic Analysis,
24 J. LEGAL. STUD. 1, 1 (1995). Consider, for example, the possibility of submitting a dispute to
arbitration instead of going to court. In some cases, arbitration may be socially preferable to
court adjudication in terms of overall costs and benefits; in other cases, the reverse may be true.
This is a complex question that we need not go into here. For our purposes, the critical point is
that once a dispute has materialized, the parties have no general incentive to make the socially
preferable choice. They may use arbitration when, all things considered, it would be better that
they go to court, or they may seek court adjudication when it would be socially preferable that
they have the matter arbitrated. Because the major costs and benefits of the decision are
external to each party, neither party is motivated to select the process that optimizes them.
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joint costs of litigation to enforce the contract. For example, if
resolving an alleged contract breach in court would cost the parties
three hundred dollars and resolving the dispute in arbitration would
cost the parties one hundred dollars, then the parties will specify the
latter mode of deciding the matter. Choosing adjudication instead
would increase the venture's costs and lower its payoffs for the parties.
The same reasoning demonstrates that there is no externalized
social benefit of deterrence at stake in contribution cases. In other
words, in contrast to noncontract cases, contracting parties' and
society's deterrence incentives coincide completely: both the parties
and society are best off by minimizing the total costs of the venture
through the creation and enforcement of optimal contract terms. Any
excess cost from disproportionate allocation of expected or incurred
damages among the parties raises the cost of the venture, reducing
the total payoff for distribution among the parties and total welfare for
distribution among members of society.
However, although the parties will avoid externalizing to each
other the cost of litigating contribution claims, the public subsidy for
adjudication still distorts the incentives of contracting parties. Absent
from the predispute negotiations is a representative of the public
interest in preventing the overuse of courts. The contracting parties
thus lack incentive to adopt predispute terms that would constrain
their use of courts beyond the point of avoiding inefficient litigation
cost for themselves. Thus, if adjudication costs the parties $100 and
arbitration costs the parties $300, a predispute contract would specify
the use of courts. 25 The parties would be unmoved by the fact that the
value of the judicial resources consumed, say $500, exceeds their
private savings from avoiding arbitration and inefficient litigation
procedures.
The main point is that in contribution cases, private and social
deterrence objectives align. Adjudication of contribution claims
therefore plays no role in motivating potential joint venturers to
allocate potential damages among themselves so that all participants
have proper incentives to take reasonable precautions against
imposing socially inappropriate risks of harm to each other. As noted,
the contracting parties' motive to minimize the venture's total private
costs will suffice. Consequently, social-deterrence benefits will not
justify the expenditure of judicial resources to adjudicate contribution
25. The parties will of course seek to reduce litigation expenses they bear, such as by
setting limits on the scope of discovery or designating a convenient venue. See Henry S. Noyes, If
You (Re)Build It, They Wll Come: Contracts to Remake the Rules of Litigation in Arbitration's
Image, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 579, 595 (2007) (suggesting that public dispute resolution
rules can be waived by contract).
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claims that the contracting parties would not otherwise bring to court
but for the public subsidy.
Having completed the discussion of how publicly subsidized
adjudication skews contracting parties' incentives to overuse courts for
resolution of contribution claims, we next explore the adverse
consequences of resulting court congestion and delay. In particular, we
consider the costs of delay in devaluing the interests of parties and in
diluting the deterrence potential of the backed-up cases.
III. THE DELAY COSTS OF PUBLICLY SUBSIDIZED ADJUDICATION
Subsidizing the consumption of judicial and related legal
resources to enforce contribution claims is socially problematic. These
resources are socially valuable and likely to remain in short supply. 26
Distributing them for free inflates demand that will clog dockets,
lengthen the queue of claims seeking judicial attention, and increase
the time it takes to have the court resolve a claim.
Generally, courts attend to civil claims on a first-come-firstserved basis. 27 The "first case" is not selected because its resolution
promises above-average social payoffs in terms of deterrence. In effect,
the expected social benefit from adjudicating the first case is
equivalent to selecting a case for resolution at random. And, while
producing average expected benefit, adjudication of the first case
necessarily delays and thereby diminishes the average social value of
the cases waiting in line.
Freeways offer an apt, well-known way of thinking about the
problem. The first car to enter the freeway travels at optimal speed
and ease, while the next car to enter will likely move somewhat more
slowly as the driver confronts the physical and safety limits created by
the first car. As more cars enter the freeway, increased congestion
disrupts drivers' schedules, frays their nerves, wastes their time in
traffic jams, risks more accidents, and produces more air pollution.
The prospect of encountering such congestion will lead some drivers to
refrain from using the freeway even if they would make more socially
beneficial use of it than others would. Like freeway congestion, courts
with congested dockets exact social costs at two interrelated levels: (1)
they impose a direct cost to litigants by decreasing the time value of
litigation; and (2) they impose an indirect cost to litigants by

26. See POSNER, supra note 20, at 59-76 (describing the caseload explosion in federal courts
and possible ways to address it).
27. Cf. Orthmann v. Apple River Campground, Inc., 765 F.2d 119, 121 (8th Cir. 1985)
(applying the "first to file" rule when two courts have concurrent jurisdiction).
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undermining the deterrence effect and other social benefits of civil
liability.
A. Direct Delay Costs
The costs of delayed adjudication are many and varied. Often
these costs arise because delay tends to diminish the availability and
quality of relevant evidence. Physical conditions change, memories
28
fade, witnesses move away, and documents may be lost or destroyed.
Courts can employ modern discovery rules to avoid such costs without
resort to much, if any, judicial intervention. However, preserving
evidence for possible use in some later, delayed adjudication will itself
29
burden the parties with greater litigation expense.
The following sections consider two basic effects of delay costs
that have received little attention in the relevant literature. The first
concerns diminution of the time -value of litigation, particularly
relating to economic losses that cannot be replaced by recovery of
damages and prejudgment interest. The second relates to the effect of
delay costs on incentives to invest in litigation.
1. Loss of Litigation Time Value
Delay imposes a direct cost on litigants through the lost time
value of litigation. Resolution of a dispute is often time sensitive.
Plaintiffs naturally have a preference for recovering damages sooner
rather than later. The availability of prejudgment interest can
mitigate some of the delay costs borne by plaintiffs, 30 but the typically
low rates of such interest ensure that a substantial residuary of delayrelated loss will likely remain. But, even adequate interest rates
would not solve the problem in many cases. For example, a plaintiff
suffering from serious harm to person or property may have a pressing
need for financial liquidity or, because of advanced age, poor health,
and other causes of economic stress, a plaintiff may discount the
utility of the delayed recovery. 31 Such cases of "forced-creditor
28. Geoffrey P. Miller, Comment, Some Thoughts on the EquilibriumHypothesis, 69 B.U. L
REV. 561, 565 (1989).
29.

See WILUAM M. HART & RODERICK D. BLANCHARD, LITIGATION AND TRIAL PRACTICE 251

(6th ed. 2007) (noting the costs that must be weighed in deciding to preserve evidence through
discovery).
30. Prejudgment interest seeks to compensate the plaintiff fully by multiplying an award by
the interest rate the plaintiff could have had. Michael S. Knoll, A Primer on Prejudgment
Interest, 75 TEX. L REV. 293, 302 (1997).
31. See John C. Keir & Robin C. Keir, Opportunity Cost:A Measure of PrejudgmentInterest,
39 Bus. LAW. 129, 147, 149 (1983) (arguing that the court should account for the fact that a
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plaintiffs" probably represent a large percentage and possibly the
majority of noncommercial-contract civil actions pending on court
dockets across the country. On the other hand, defendants tend to
prefer deferring the payment of damages. 32 And, in any event, liability
insurance renders the defendants (if not the insurers) indifferent as to
when damages are paid. However, defendants may have a strong
countervailing desire for expeditious resolution of the case to remove
the burden of litigation on key personnel, operations, finances, and
33
market reputation.
The parties can always reduce delay costs by settling their
dispute. Indeed, all else equal, by lowering the parties' expected trial
payoffs, delay costs will exert added pressure on parties to avoid
litigation cost and risk by settling. 34 And settlement is usually effected
without the need for judicial intervention. The extent to which delay
costs motivate settlement will depend, however, on how much
settlement reduces those costs by hastening the plaintiff's receipt of
monetary recovery and the defendant's ability to restore the prelawsuit status quo.
But, even if settling the dispute out of court reduces delay
costs, the expectation of such costs will nevertheless adversely affect
the parties' respective payoffs from settlement. Put simply, the
prospect of delay will distort the terms of settlement measured against
a baseline in which the parties faced no significant delay. The parties
will apply a delay-cost discount to their respective payoffs from trial
and each will factor the discounted value into the formulation of their
respective reservation points. If, as is often the case, forced-creditor
plaintiff missed the opportunity to invest at a favorable interest rate); R.F. Lanzillotti & A.K
Esquibel, Measuring Damages in Commercial Litigation: Present Value of Lost Opportunities, 5
J. ACCT. AUDITING & FIN. 125, 139-41 (1990). Litigants will "sell" their claims in settlement for
less than their expected judgment value for the same reason those with an immediate need for
money pawn their property. See, e.g., luliana Cenar, The Legal and Accounting Dimension of
Pawn, 2009 ECON. & APPLIED INFORMATICS 199, 205 (2009) (citing money-in-hand value as the
primary benefit of pawnshop loans).
32. Knoll, supra note 30, at 297 (suggesting that defendants can effectively borrow money
without paying interest by delaying litigation). Prejudgment interest thus tends to mitigate the
defendant's preference for delay. However, it may operate in the opposite direction. By raising
the stakes for both parties, prejudgment interest may increase delay costs. See Richard A.
Posner, Legal Procedure and JudicialAdministration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 421 (1973) (arguing
that prejudgment interest raises the stakes of the litigation and thereby creates the opposite
effect of delay costs). In addition, prejudgment interest tends to dilute the plaintiffs preference
for speedy resolution of the case.
33.

See THE BROOKINGS INST., JUSTICE FOR ALL: REDUCING COSTS AND DELAY IN CIVIL

LITIGATION 1 (1990); Keir & Keir, supra note 31, at 147.
34. See George L. Priest, Private Litigants and the Court Congestion Problem, 69 B.U. L
REV. 527, 534 (1989) (discussing the interrelationship between court congestion and settlement
incentives).
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plaintiffs are put at a greater disadvantage than defendants by delay,
this asymmetry will translate directly into inappropriately low
settlement recoveries with a predictable dilution of deterrent
incentives for defendants.
To illustrate, suppose the plaintiff's damages are $100,000 and
each party perceives a 50% chance of prevailing at trial. For
simplicity's sake, assume that the parties have equal litigation costs
and assume that settlement, if it occurs, is struck at the midpoint of
the bargaining range. 35 Then if there were no significant anticipated
delays, the parties would settle the case for the expected value of the
judgment, $50,000. However, the outcome changes if we consider
anticipated delay costs. Suppose that, due to lack of liquidity, pressing
medical costs, and other financial strains, the anticipated delay of
court resolution leads the plaintiff (notwithstanding receipt of
prejudgment interest) to discount the value of a judicial damage
award by 60%. Assume further that anticipated delay costs add
(notwithstanding payment of prejudgment interest) 10% to the value
of a judicial award for the defendant. In this scenario, the effect of
introducing delay shifts the plaintiffs and defendant's effective
expected damage award at trial to $20,000 and $55,000, respectively.
Maintaining our assumption that they settle at the midpoint, the
settlement amount drops from $50,000 to $37,500.36 In this example,
the delay costs effectively tax away 25% of the amount that the
defendant pays in settlement. To the extent that such lowered
settlements can be foreseen at the time of primary behavior, it will
translate into fewer defendant precautions against accident.
2. Loss of Litigation Investment Incentive
So far, we have held constant the parties' incentives to invest
in litigating their respective sides of the case. At this point, we take
account of the effect that delay costs, which lower a party's expected
payoff, have on these incentives. It appears that delay costs will have
a differential impact on the parties' respective investment incentives,
depressing plaintiffs' incentives while exerting mixed effects on
37
defendants' incentives.

35. These assumptions are made for clarity of exposition and do not affect the underlying
point.
36. Our arithmetic here is ($20,000 + $55,000) / 2 = $37,500.
37. Delay costs have long been recognized as posing a potentially complete barrier to suit by
plaintiffs. See Miller, supra note 28, at 561 (arguing that delay costs will eliminate the economic

incentive to file suit for litigants at the margin). To our knowledge, no prior consideration has
been given to the general asymmetric effects on the parties' respective investment incentives. Cf.
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For plaintiffs, because delay costs lower the expected recovery
from trial, their incentive to invest in pursuit of that gain is
correspondingly reduced. All else equal, the greater a party's stake in
a case, the more the party will be prepared to spend to protect that
stake. Cutting a plaintiff's effective gain from litigation through a
"delay tax" predictably weakens the plaintiffs motive to invest in
winning the case, which lowers the plaintiffs probability of success at
trial. With the odds of winning at trial thus eroded, the plaintiff's
settlement position will also further decline. To put the point most
explicitly, even if delay had no effect on investment in the case, delay
costs would exert downward pressure on the plaintiffs settlement
position. When we then factor in the plaintiffs depressed incentive to
invest in the case due to delay, we find that the downward pressure is
augmented.
In our example, the plaintiff had a fifty percent chance of
winning a $100,000 judgment at trial. Assume that it requires an
investment of $20,000 to generate that probability of success and that
with a smaller investment of $10,000 the plaintiff would have a thirty
percent chance of prevailing at trial. In the absence of delay, the
plaintiff would rationally make the larger investment in order to
secure the greater chance of winning at trial. 38 Yet if, as above, we
suppose that delayed adjudication effectively cuts the value of the
judgment for a liquidity-constrained plaintiff by sixty percent, then
the plaintiffs investment decision changes. It is no longer worthwhile
to make the larger investment. 39 The plaintiff will make the lower
investment and the expected judgment will fall to $30,000.
Discounting that figure by sixty percent yields a $12,000 value.
Maintaining our earlier assumption about the effect of anticipated
delay on the defendant's discount rate, and still assuming that the
parties make the same litigation investment, we observe that
defendant's effective expected liability is therefore $33,000. The
midpoint of the parties' expected damage recovery and liability,
respectively, is $22,500. This represents a fifty-five-percent fall from

Rosenberg, supra note 21 (comparing investment incentive effects of continuing or changing a set
of basic rules such as those governing proof, causation, and aggregation of claims that structure
the civil liability system).
38. With no delay costs in the picture, a $20,000 investment will yield an expected
judgment of $50,000, while a $10,000 investment would yield only an expected judgment of
$30,000. The larger investment yields a greater expected payoff of $10,000.
39. A $20,000 investment would yield an expected judgment of $50,000, which discounted
by 60% is only $20,000. In contrast, a $10,000 investment would yield an expected judgment of
$30,000, which discounted by 60% is $12,000. Only the lower investment yields an expected
profit.
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the originally stipulated expected damage award for $50,000.40 Once
again, to the extent that these dynamics are predictable at the time of
primary care decisions, the weakening of defendant deterrence is
plain.
Turning to the defendant, we find that delay costs may have
varying effects on investment incentives. The results depend on
whether, and how, the litigation investment affects the magnitude of
delay cost. For example, investing in litigation may lengthen the time
it takes for the court to adjudicate the case due to an increase in the
scope of discovery, the number of witnesses called to testify, or the
volume of motions filed. If so, the above analysis relating to the
plaintiffs investment incentives applies to the defendant's investment
incentives. The burden of delay costs will reduce the marginal net
payoff from the additional unit of litigation investment and, all else
equal, the defendant will find it more cost effective to invest less in the
litigation.41
On the other hand, if changing the level of investment in
litigation would not significantly affect the amount of incurred delay
costs, then the defendant would rationally stay with its otherwise
optimal investment strategy. Indeed, it may often be the case that
defendants' litigation investments will have offsetting effects, both
prolonging and shortening the duration of adjudication. Moreover,
shortening the time it takes for the court to resolve the dispute may
only reduce or eliminate future delay costs. In contrast to prejudgment
interest for plaintiffs, hastening resolution of a case will not redress
defendants' previously incurred delay costs. Not even full vindication
of defendants' position at trial can adequately and fully compensate
for practically irreplaceable losses such as diversion of key personnel
from business to litigation tasks, forgone business opportunities,
product withdrawals from the market, and bankruptcy. 42 However,
the defendant will likely treat such accrued losses as sunk costs and

40. Similar logic explains why in lower-stakes cases, where damages are well below
$100,000, delay costs may cause a claim's settlement value to disappear entirely.
41. Strategic interaction with the plaintiff may create some complexities. If the plaintiff
decides to invest less in the litigation, the defendant may do the same, or the defendant maydepending on a host of variables-decide to increase its investment in order to overwhelm the
plaintiff. We cannot rule out either possibility a priori, and both responses are observed in
practice. By the same token, if the defendant drops its investment in the litigation, it is possible
this will induce the plaintiff to raise its investment in order to exploit the defendant's weakness.
42. See Keir & Keir, supra note 31, at 147 (discussing how businesses calculate the
opportunity cost of litigation).
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proceed with its investment strategy as if they had not been
43
incurred.
These different possibilities make it difficult to categorically
predict the overall effects of delay on litigation investment. Delay
lowers the effective stakes of the litigation, which should lead both
parties (and particularly the plaintiff) to lower their investments. This
may not be universally true, however, and the strategic dynamics of
litigation are such that if one party lowers its investment, then the
other may raise its own investment in response. 44 Nevertheless, we
can safely offer the following generalizations: First, for reasons we
have discussed, anticipated delay will frequently lower plaintiff
recoveries with the result of diluting defendant deterrence. In other
cases it may be that defendants are put at greater disadvantage with
the result of creating excessive deterrence incentives. Second, even in
types of litigation where neither party is put at a systematic
disadvantage, anticipated delay introduces greater variability into
party investments, and this variability leads to greater
unpredictability in the civil justice system, which itself is harmful to
the aim of establishing optimal deterrence.
B. Indirect Delay Costs
The forgoing analysis explains why and how delay decreases
the deterrence benefit that society derives from the civil liability
system. As noted above, when the parties discount the value of
adjudication due to delay costs, settlement and judgment outcomes are
distorted, potentially resulting in adverse deterrence effects. Parties
anticipating settling for a delay-cost-discounted payoff may be led to
invest too much or too little in precautions. For example, if the
defendant forecasts that delay costs will create a greater disadvantage
for the plaintiff than for itself, the defendant will anticipate paying
less than the claim is worth and be underdeterred. And, if a defendant
anticipates that it will be at a greater disadvantage than the plaintiff
due to delay costs, the defendant will internalize the exposure to an
excessive level of liability and damages and hence be overdeterred. If
the adverse effect of delay costs on settlement is randomly distributed,
then there might be negligible distortion of incentives. However, often
before they engage in risky activity, potential defendants will be in a

43. Defendants will sink the delay costs they incur automatically upon being sued; for
plaintiffs, in contrast, delay costs are entirely a future burden at the time they choose to
commence litigation.
44. See supranote 43 (explaining this phenomenon).
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position to predict which party will bear the greater burden of delay
costs and, therefore, will apply the greater discount to the payoff from
adjudication. For similar reasons, delay costs that result in defendants
paying too little in judgments and settlements jeopardize the
compensation function of judicially enforced liability. Conversely,
delay costs that result in defendants paying too much in judgments
and settlements waste legal resources merely to effect a
noncompensatory wealth transfer, and also create moral hazard
problems.
To the extent that they alter the parties' investment incentives,
delay costs will distort trial and settlement outcomes, undermining
deterrence and compensation objectives. As illustrated by the above
example, delay costs can result in pricing both claims and defenses out
of the system. When such results are systematic, civil liability can
have significant underdeterrent or overdeterrent consequences. This is
not to suggest that marginal effects are likely to be negligible. On the
contrary, harm or loss should be internalized fully because in reality
investments in precautions are continuous. Threatening liability less
or more than harm can distort incentives especially when the risk
taking involved arises from business or governmental activity that
exposes a large population to injury.
In sum, the public subsidy for adjudication results in delay
costs that can produce socially undesirable distortions in the
deterrence (and if relevant, the compensation) output of the system.
The magnitude of this problem is uncertain. As we note in the next
Part, the total public subsidy for adjudication is difficult to measure.
The direct, easily calculable financial outlays such as for the operation
of courthouses and for the salaries of judges and other judicial
personnel represent a small fraction of the total costs of litigation.
Moreover, there is a dearth of empirical studies of the deterrence
function of civil liability. This is not at all surprising. Answering this
question entails enormously complicated and costly assessments of
both the actual deterrence effects from subsidizing the existing mix of
cases in the waiting line and the counterfactual deterrence effects
from adjudicating the mix of cases that would queue up in the
subsidy's absence.
However, along with other commentators, we proceed on the
assumption that the public subsidy of adjudication and the resulting
social costs are substantial. And we also join their appraisal that the
one solution that seems most relevantly appropriate is entirely
impractical. That solution would have courts screen cases for their
relative deterrence value. Courts rarely do so, and the explanation is
patently clear. As we just noted, the courts would encounter an
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insurmountable barrier of complexity and cost against developing
reliable information to assess the social cost from delay-induced
deterrence distortions.
This is not to suggest that the subsidy operates unchecked.
Access to courts is strictly controlled. The constraint is not imposed by
substantive regulation of the deterrence value of incoming cases
because courts largely operate as a substantively neutral
clearinghouse. Rather, the main check on access to courts is litigation
cost. The high cost (and risk) of litigation essentially dictates the
composition of the case queue. Only cases promising sufficiently high
net payoffs in damages and other outcomes of value to the parties are
likely to survive the delay costs. The results of this winnowing process
correlate somewhat with the objective of minimizing total social costs
by tending to exclude cases involving claims of less serious injury (or
less meritorious nature, or both) and hence lower financial stakes. Yet,
the correlation is tenuous. In operating on the basis of the parties'
(and lawyers') myopic interest in maximizing their private payoff from
litigation without regard to the social need for deterrence, this market
process can do no better than blindly and crudely screen for socially
worthwhile cases for adjudication.
On the stated assumption of substantial social cost from
subsidized adjudication and in light of the impractical and ineffective
means currently available for promoting a more socially desirable
allocation of judicial resources, we proceed in Part IV to advance our
proposed user fee.
IV. USER-FEE DESIGN AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES
We begin this Part by briefly outlining the proposed design for
a user fee. Its aim is to compel contracting parties to internalize the
social cost of resolving their contribution disputes in court, aligning
the private and social motives for adjudication of such cases. Our
analysis suggests that eliminating the public subsidy for adjudication
would curtail excessive consumption of judicial resources, thereby
reducing overall delay costs and increasing average deterrence effects
of civil liability.
After outlining the proposal, we go on to discuss the principal
questions regarding its implementation. For the most part,
operational concerns prove either insubstantial or readily solvable by
simple design modifications. We conclude that charging the parties at
minimum for the substantial, easily calculable overhead costs of
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establishing and operating courts promises sufficient social benefit to
45
warrant employing the proposed user fee.
We take up this social cost inquiry in the balance of this Part,
focusing on potential loss of deterrence and precedent-making value
for applying the user fee to curtail litigation of contribution cases in
court. The general conclusion is that the proposal is unlikely to have
an adverse effect on the goal of deterrence. Indeed, it may well
improve the deterrence results of contribution-case adjudication. The
proposal's waiver provision, which preserves the ability of courts to
adjudicate substantial questions of law, meets concerns about loss of
precedent-making benefits.
A. Design, Implementation,and Social Benefit
To address the problem of delay costs, we propose that courts
charge a user fee to the parties in contribution cases for the social cost
of adjudication. Internalizing this cost corrects parties' incentives on
the margin when they choose between courts and arbitration for
resolving contribution disputes. This also corrects parties' incentives
when they choose between going to court and forgoing their claim.
The user fee we advance also includes a special feature lacking
in prior proposals to address the problem of potential loss of
precedent-making value from the adjudication of contribution cases.
The problem arises from the divergence between the social and private
payoff from the judicial development of precedent. Because the parties
in contribution cases do not fully internalize the resulting social
benefits, they will lack sufficient incentive to invest in litigating cases
beyond the point of their expected private payoff simply to provide a
court with an opportunity to make precedent. To address this
misalignment in private and social motives for litigation investment,
our proposal authorizes courts to reduce the user fee by the amount
attributable to the cost of adjudicating substantial legal questions. In
short, our proposal creates a contingent, public subsidy for
adjudication of contribution cases exhibiting sufficient promise of

45. We emphasize that the principal social benefits of charging a user fee do not derive from
the new revenue stream or from saving some amount of judicial resources per se. The benefits
derive from removing a subsidy that induces parties to overuse courts, freeing up judicial
resources to lower delay costs and increase average deterrence. The benefits of the user fee are
greatly magnified as judicial budgets face sharp cutbacks. See, e.g., Adam Skaggs & Maria da
Silva, CourtingDisaster:Justice Can't Be a Budget BargainingChip, SACRAMENTO BEE, July 14,
2011, http://www.sacbee.com/2011/07/13/3768390/courting-disaster-justice-cant.html#storylink=
misearch (outlining judicial budget reductions in California and other states for 2010 and 2011).

2011]

CONTRACTING PARTIES SHOULD PAY THEIR WAY

1941

precedential value to warrant the social investment of judicial
resources.
Our proposal is straightforward and, for the most part, its
implementation poses no design difficulties. To account for the
incurred social costs, the fee would be assessed and taxed at the close
of the contribution case. Whether the fee should be taxed against the
party who initiates, responds to, or loses the contribution claim also
seems of little regulatory consequence. As with most other aspects of
allocating liability among the joint venturers, the parties can resolve
this question by predispute contract, designating who will ultimately
bear the burden of judicially imposed costs as well as the general
litigation expenses. Levying the user fee against the initiating party is
the best default rule; it is simple and certain, making it both easy for
to work from in
courts to administer and easy for the parties
46
formulating the terms of predispute contracts.
One major design problem, however, does not appear amenable
to a precise solution. This problem concerns the practicality of courts
setting the optimal user fee. To completely remove the public subsidy
for adjudication of contribution cases, the fee should effectively tax the
parties for the total social cost of adjudication. That cost has two
components. First, there is the judicial overhead: the fixed and
marginal costs incurred in establishing and funding the operation of
courts to adjudicate contribution cases. This expenditure of judicial
resources is both substantial and reasonably calculable. We surmise
that courts could readily compute and levy the tax without practical
difficulty in any given case.
The second component involves the social cost resulting from
delayed adjudication. Calculating this element of social cost poses
daunting practical problems. Determining this cost will require courts
(or legislatures) to estimate the delay-induced distortions in the
average deterrence payoff from civil liability, a task entailing complex
investigation across all or at least broad categories of cases,
development of currently unavailable evidence, and a comparative
assessment of the actual and counterfactual deterrence effects on a
system operating with and without the public subsidy for adjudication.
If, as previously noted, information costs would prevent courts from
selecting cases for adjudication according to their relative deterrence
46. It is possible for a predispute contract to impose the user fee on the losing party, which
might entail substantial additional expenditure of judicial resources to apportion the costs. For
example, there might be added cost for determining whether, and the extent to which, a party
has "lost" in a case that settles or even in a case that goes to judgment. In these situations, the
court would tack on the added cost to the fee for adjudicating the principal matters presented by
the contribution dispute.
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payoffs, then it is likely those same information costs would prevent
courts from computing the delay-related loss of deterrence payoff to
include in the user fee.
Perhaps the best practical alternative is to charge the parties
for the direct fixed and marginal costs of resolving their contribution
dispute in court.47 Because contribution cases consume substantial
amounts of judicial resources, they are likely to play a significantly
relevant role in creating court congestion and the resulting delay
costs. If the user fee eliminates a large fraction of the cases from court,
delay will likely be reduced along with the average distortion of
deterrence outcomes. On this assumption, we believe that it is
worthwhile to investigate the costs of employing a proposed user fee
that only charges parties for judicial overhead as a means of reducing
the social cost from delayed adjudication.
B. Lost Social Benefit from AdjudicatingFewer ContributionCases
The proposed user fee should operate to discourage some
fraction of contribution cases from being litigated in court. Assuming
that this would lessen delay costs and thereby increase the average
level of effective deterrence from the adjudication of all other civil
cases, the next question to address is whether reducing the
adjudication of contribution cases will adversely affect the functioning
of the judicial system and produce offsetting social costs. In particular,
we examine how discouraging the adjudication of contribution claims
may diminish the social benefit of deterrence and precedent making. 48
1. Deterrence
Measured against the baseline of the current rate and volume
of contribution-case adjudication, imposing a user fee will diminish
the incentive to invest in litigating such cases in court. Eliminating
47. It may be practical to estimate statistically the average deterrence loss from delay, and
for courts to charge that amount across-the-board in all, or large categories of, contribution cases.
The initial estimate would likely only roughly approximate the average loss, but this estimate
could be refined over time based on follow-up studies. The utility of charging the average loss
from delay will depend on the variability among contribution cases in relation to the relative
input to the delay-cost problem, and the extent to which indiscriminate pricing would lead to
gaming by the parties and the risk of moral hazard.
48. We focus on the principal benefits of deterrence and precedent making because other
salutary consequences of adjudication, such as avoiding violent or festering disputes, have little
or no relevance to the joint-venture contribution cases considered here. Courts are also regarded
as expositors if not founts of social-welfare-enhancing values. Application of the user fee is
unlikely to diminish this benefit, the production of which roughly coincides with that of
precedent making, and hence should be preserved largely intact by the waiver provision.
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the public subsidy for this adjudication will conserve judicial resources
by pricing some fraction of cases out of court altogether, reducing the
parties' expenditures on litigating another fraction of the cases, and
motivating the parties in some other fraction to substitute liquidated
for allocated damages or adopt some other nonlitigation solution. The
question is whether the baseline level of adjudication is excessive or
suboptimal relative to the socially desirable level-the level of
adjudication that minimizes total social costs.
The forgoing analysis shows that the current level of
contribution-case adjudication is excessive and that eliminating the
subsidy would better align the parties' incentives with the socially
optimal incentive for the utilization of courts to resolve these claims.
Applying the proposed user fee to contribution claims between
contracting parties would not subvert deterrence objectives because no
plausible case can be made that the level of their adjudication is
inadequate rather than excessive. The basic reason is that the parties'
incentives to maximize profit align with the social objective to
minimize total accident costs through optimal investment both in
precautions and in litigation. Misallocation of damages among the
joint venturers increases the risk of accident and therefore increases
the expected costs of the project. Subjecting one party to
disproportionate liability may induce excessive investment in
precautions, while also absolving another party of a share of the
liability, leading that party to take inadequate precautions. But
contracting parties have a compelling motivation to eliminate their
disproportionate exposure to damages and to contractually realign the
allocation of their respective liability-related burdens. Predispute
contracts allocating damages serve to minimize the parties' total costs
and, by doing so, promote the social objective of minimizing total
accident costs. Similarly, the parties would avoid incurring the
unnecessary costs associated with litigating contribution cases. Unlike
parties to "stranger" cases for whom the inability to negotiate
predispute contracts means that access to court is often the only legal
enforcement option, the parties to contribution cases can formulate
predispute contract terms for allocating damages based on a virtually
continuous array of dispute resolution options. Joint-venture
disputants are unlikely to experience a precipitous fall from
overpriced judicial allocation and deterrence into an abyss of no
allocation and deterrence.
Consider a joint-venture version of the above example in which
the $20,000 damages represent the amount of disproportionate
liability that party X expects to bear in the event of an accident.
Assume that this threat of excessive liability leads X to invest $19,000
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in order to eliminate the accident risk. At the same time, party Y
spends nothing, despite having the capacity to take reasonable
precautions. But also assume that if X can shift its excess expected
liability to Y, then each party will be motivated to spend $8,000, or a
total of $16,000, to eliminate the risk of accident. Now suppose that
the parties anticipate the possibility of a dispute arising over Y's share
of excess liability. Assume that the parties' predispute contract allows
contribution claims to address allocation disputes. Finally, assume
that the social cost of adjudicating the contribution case in court is
$2,000 versus $1,000 for the parties to arbitrate the claim. In the
absence of a user fee, the parties would elect to litigate the
contribution case in court because it would be cheaper than paying
$1,000 more for arbitration. However, applying the user fee would
align the parties' incentives with society's deterrence interest in
optimal allocation of expected damages. The parties would choose
arbitration over adjudication, thereby minimizing total accident costs,
private and social from $18,000 ($16,000 plus $2,000) to $17,000
49
($16,000 plus $1,000).
2. Precedent Making
A good case can be made for retaining the subsidy for
contribution cases that present substantial questions of law and
thereby provide the opportunity for courts to make precedent. In other
words, applying the proposed user fee might discourage the parties
from using the courts to litigate some cases that could provide the
basis for socially beneficial rulings affirming, clarifying, or changing
existing law to guide the behavior of joint venturers in the future. In
contrast to deterrence, the social interest in precedent making
through litigating contribution cases in court would likely diverge
substantially from the interest of present joint venturers-namely,
society would prefer a substantially higher investment in precedent
making than the parties would. From the parties' standpoint, the
private investment would probably garner only a relatively small
fractional share of the benefit, while the bulk of it would go to other
parties organizing future joint ventures (including competitors).
Although many cases priced out of court will go to arbitration,
arbitral resolution of contribution cases is unlikely to provide a full
replacement for court-made precedent. Even if arbitrators were as
49. Note that if arbitrating a contribution case entailed high joint investments by the
parties-due either to factual complexity or to potential litigation abuse-at some point the
parties would find it profit-maximizing, and hence it would be socially desirable, to substitute
liquidated damages for proportional allocation.
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qualified as judges to make precedent, it is doubtful that the parties
would be willing pay the price for comparable services. And that price
would be quite steep, far higher than the cost of simply deciding the
legal questions for the sole benefit of the present parties. To begin
with, arbitrators would labor longer and more intensively to decide
legal questions for the benefit of parties other than those financing the
proceedings; indeed they do this for the benefit of an entire industry.
In addition, to enhance the quality and coherence of the rulings,
arbitration would have to develop an appellate or functionally
equivalent review process, and the parties would have to pay its
overhead. In addition, there is also a supply-side problem. In the
absence of proprietary control over the work product, arbitration-made
precedent becomes a public good. 50 As such, competitive free riding
among arbitrators will inhibit their investing optimally to make high51
grade precedent.
Our proposal is designed to preserve the flow into court of
contribution cases with precedent-making value, while at the same
time reducing the excess demand for adjudication of contribution cases
generally. Thus, we advance a user fee that both taxes the parties for
court costs to discourage marginal overconsumption of judicial
resources and authorizes trial courts in the first instance to waive the
costs attributable to adjudication of substantial legal questions.
Therefore, at the end of an adjudication, the court would assess
taxable adjudication costs and would also consider whether the
52
resulting legal precedent justifies waiving some of these costs.
Overall, waivers probably will be infrequent because
contribution cases are unlikely to provide precedent-making

50. For evidence that arbitrators rely on arbitral precedent in making decisions, see
generally Jeffery P. Commission, Precedent in Investment Treaty Arbitration:A CitationAnalysis
of a Developing Jurisprudence, 24 J. INTL ARB. 129, 129 (2007) (reviewing the value and
precedential role of tribunal cases, awards, and orders in investment treaty arbitration);
Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Arbitral Precedent:Dream, Necessity or Excuse?, 23 ARB. INT'L 357,
362-69 (2007) (analyzing the motivation and potential obligation of arbitrators to rely on past
awards in international commercial arbitration, sports arbitration, and international investment
arbitration); W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Toward a Theory of Precedent in Arbitration, 51 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1895, 1907-11 (2010) (discussing the robust system of arbitral precedent in
international investment arbitration and labor arbitration).
51. See Landes & Posner, supra note 15, at 248 (explaining that due to the public-good
character of precedent, a free market in judicial services would not lead to the production of
precedent as a by-product of the efforts of competing judges).
52. Normally the parties would move for waiver, but the court should also have authority to
reduce the user-fee charge on its own motion in the event that the parties fail to appreciate the
precedential value of the case. The court might announce at the outset or early on in the
litigation that it viewed the case as having precedential value and that it would entertain an
application for waiver of the user fee at the close of proceedings.
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opportunities. Most contribution litigation involves largely factual
disputes over whether and how much contribution payment is due.
Resolving these factual disputes has little (if any) precedential value.
Indeed, these are factual disputes that would be well-suited for
arbitration.
In any event, to avoid further burdening the process, the
standard for waiver should be familiar to courts. Although it is beyond
the scope of the paper to develop this aspect of the proposal in detail,
we briefly note two available formulations. One possible formulation is
suggested by Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under
Rule 11, a legal argument that fails to pass a minimum substantive
threshold of "nonfrivolous" is barred from court, and the attorney who
presents it may be subject to sanction. 53 If the standard from Rule 11
is used in our proposal, the waiver would apply broadly to all "claims,
defenses, and other legal contentions" that advance "a nonfrivolous
argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for
establishing new law."54 While this standard may impose only a small
burden on courts, assuming frivolous contentions are easily identified,
waiving the user fee for all claims that pass such a minimal test will
eviscerate the benefits created by a user fee. Moreover, the
"nonfrivolous" standard may actually prompt the parties to game the
system because some minimally sufficient claims or defenses may be
cheap for parties to assert yet expensive for a court to resolve on the
merits and also to differentiate from nonwaivable, pedestrian legal
questions for purposes of assessing costs covered by the user fee.
The standard for federal interlocutory appellate review
provides a better test than Rule 11. 5 As applied to our proposal, the
user fee would be waived for adjudication of "a controlling question of
56
law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion."
This test seems more useful because there is a relatively high
correlation between outcome-determinative legal questions that
provoke substantial differences of opinion and legal questions that
present opportunities to make valuable legal precedent. Applying this
test is also unlikely to create a significant burden on courts; by the
time the waiver decision is made, the presiding judge will have
already become immersed in the issues. Finally, because establishing
that the question is outcome determinative and that there are
53. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c).
54. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2).
55. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2006) (specifying the standard governing the authority of federal
district courts to certify an otherwise nonappealable order for interlocutory appellate review by a
court of appeals).
56. Id.

2011] CONTRACTING PARTIES SHOULD PAY THEIR WAY

1947

substantial grounds for disagreement requires a greater litigation
investment than simply asserting a nonfrivolous claim, the
57
interlocutory appeal test is less susceptible to gaming by the parties.
Our waiver proposal will neither impose new or substantial
information burdens on courts nor distort judicial incentives. Judges
routinely acquire the information necessary for applying the waiver in
the process of ruling on various outcome-determinative motions by the
parties (often prompted by the court) relating to dismissal, summary
judgment, preliminary injunction, scope and intensity of discovery,
class action certification, and judgment as a matter of law during and
after trial. Nor is there reason to expect significant judicial abuse of
the power to waive the user fee. Judges are unlikely to refrain from
applying it to avoid the burden of resolving a substantial legal issue.
Few judges would forgo such an opportunity to boost their professional
reputation and influence. And in any event, it could be either
unavailing, as the question may well come back to the judge on
remand from the appellate court, or counterproductive, as any room
on the docket will be quickly filled by a claim waiting in the queue.
Empowering the presiding judge with discretion to tax litigants for
court costs might also be viewed as problematic due to concerns that
the judge could penalize a party for advancing unpopular arguments,
which would thereby chill incentives to vigorously litigate the case.
However, there is little evidence of judicial abuse of such discretionary
power. 58 And if the certification standard from interlocutory appeals is

57. Given that parties are already unlikely to game a waiver provision defined by the §1292
certification standard, it may be desirable to have a less-restrictive condition than the
"controlling question of law." For example, courts could draw upon the well-established
requirements for applying the rule of collateral estoppel to preclude relitigation of an issue
decided in an earlier case. It should be noted that some of the requirements for applying
collateral estoppel reduce the risk of using this doctrine to preclude relitigation of prior
adjudications that may have been the product of collusion between the parties, or that may have
been the product of significant asymmetry in the respective incentives of the adverse parties to
invest in the litigation. Regarding the former risk, the proponent of collateral estoppel is
required to show that the issue was not only actually and fully litigated in the prior adjudication,
but also that its determination was logically and realistically relevant to the court's ruling (e.g.,
that the ruling on the particular issue was necessary to the outcome and not merely dictum). See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982) ("When an issue of fact or law is actually
litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the
judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties.").
Furthermore, because collateral estoppel is frequently applied in contribution cases to preclude
relitigation of common questions of law and fact, adopting its requirements to delimit the scope
of the user-fee waiver provision will not impose any new burden on the court or the parties.
58. See Gerald Stern, Judicial Error that is Subject to Discipline in New York, 32 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 1547, 1547 (2004) (pointing out that judicial conduct commissions dismiss the great
majority of the complaints they receive).
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adopted for user-fee waivers, the substantial question of law
requirement would make waivers less vulnerable to abuse because the
decision could be readily reviewable by an appellate court.
V. APPLYING THE USER FEE TO COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS GENERALLY
In this Part we consider the appropriateness of applying our
user-fee proposal to all commercial contracts. For the reasons
previously advanced in support of applying our proposal to
contribution claims, we conclude that the user fee should be applied to
commercial-contract cases generally. We do, however, discuss a
possible narrow exception for the small class of cases in which a user
fee would discourage socially productive projects.
A. Extension to Commercial-ContractCases
The argument for extending the proposed user fee to
commercial contracts generally follows directly from the foregoing
analysis of its application to contribution claims. First, the public good
of deterrence can be disregarded because the proposal applies only to
the internal commercial consequences for the contracting parties that
flow from contract breach. These contracting parties have the
incentive to minimize joint costs through predispute contracts that
provide optimal terms to reasonably reduce the risks of breach,
including by specifying the preferred means (courts or arbitration) for
enforcing the terms of the agreement.5 9 Second, the other public good
of adjudication that we have discussed, precedent making, is
addressed by the proposal's waiver provision, which would apply to
any extension of the user fee.
Compensation objectives, though not necessarily involving a
public good, should also be set aside. The reasons for this are
unrelated to our proposed user fee. Essentially, civil liability is a poor
and often counterproductive means of providing risk-averse parties
with needed insurance. 60 In view of the prevalence of commercially
59. See Christopher R. Drahozal & Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Litigation and
Arbitration:An Application to Franchise Contracts, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 549, 558 (2003) (arguing
that arbitration is more accurate and therefore reduces the likelihood of under- and overdeterrence from contract breach); Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract
Interpretation,83 TEX. L. REV. 1581, 1594 (2005) (noting that arbitrators are more reliable
interpreters of contracts than judges or juries).
60. See TILLINGHAST-TbWERS PERRIN, supra note 22, at 17; see also A. Mitchell Polinsky &
Steven Shavell, The Uneasy Case for Product Liability, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1469-70 (2010)
(finding that the tort system is very expensive, as roughly two dollars of legal expenses are
incurred for every dollar an accident victim receives).
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and governmentally supplied insurance, we see no reason for
compensation objectives to play a meaningful role in determining the
extension of the user fee. Moreover, commercial parties can employ
various standard or customized contract terms to address risk of loss
from breach. In any event, arbitration is a fully adequate substitute
for adjudication as a source of compensation. Indeed, arbitration may
well be superior given its potential to deliver compensation at lower
61
cost and with less delay than courts.
The principal problem raised by applying the user fee generally
to commercial-contract cases relates to situations in which making a
predispute agreement entails more expected cost than benefit for the
parties. For example, the parties may anticipate high negotiation costs
and a small probability of reaching an agreement. In other cases they
may perceive the risk of breach and resulting litigation as so remote
as to justify considering the matter if and when the risk materializes.
More generally, there will be cases in which the parties engage in
transactions-usually sporadically or in a one-off deal-that involve
relatively small amounts of money.
However, the practical opportunity to negotiate and conclude
predispute contracts is by no means the entire problem. Indeed,
exempting such cases for that reason alone would forfeit a large
amount of the user fee's potential benefits. To be sure, in these cases,
the user fee has no relevant influence over the parties' decision to
litigate in court or pursue arbitration. Essentially, the parties end up
in court by default. Yet, the user fee still plays a useful role in
constraining the parties from overusing judicial resources while
investing in litigation. By raising the costs of litigating contract claims
in court, the user fee provides two benefits beyond influencing the
parties' choice between adjudication and arbitration. First, increasing
litigation costs will reduce the parties' investment in litigation and
thereby lower their consumption of judicial resources toward the
optimal level. Second, the expected increase in litigation costs also
increases the costs of the joint venture, lowering the project's activity
level and, correspondingly, its accident risk. Similarly, the expected
increase in litigation will discourage the parties from opportunistically
committing or claiming breach of contract. These benefits are obtained
regardless of the parties' actual preference for court or arbitration.
Because the motives for filing and investing more or less in lawsuits

61. See Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Exercise of Contract Freedom in the Making of
Arbitration Agreements, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNATL L. 1189, 1200 (2003) (arguing that arbitration
has achieved prominence in the United States largely due to the delays and costs which make
judicial litigation remote and unattractive).
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are rationally severable, the parties' frustrated preference is
irrelevant to achieving the benefits from the application of the user
fee.
B. Narrow Exception
There is one possible exception: a small class of cases in which
elimination of the public subsidy for adjudication would discourage
parties from engaging in socially productive projects. Such cases
would be exceedingly rare as they require the conjunction of two
highly unlikely conditions. First, the parties would lack a practical
opportunity to negotiate and conclude predispute contracts specifying
their preference for litigating in court or arbitration (or lack the
means to pay for arbitration or other nonjudicial alternatives). Second,
the monetary value of their project must be so small that its fate
would be determined by adding the marginal expected expense of a
user fee to the costs of litigating a commercial case in court. In our
estimation, these conditions would not arise together in the vast
majority of judicially adjudicated commercial-contract cases. To the
extent that exemption for this small class of unusual cases is
desirable, we suggest that courts or legislatures adopt an amount-incontroversy test that sets a low threshold for application of the user
fee.
The key to the problematic nature of cases in which predispute
contracting is uneconomical relates to the effect of the user fee on the
parties' incentives to engage in socially productive, albeit low
monetary value, joint ventures or other commercial deals. If the
parties anticipate paying for the costs of enforcing their contracts in
court, but lack the practical opportunity to opt for cheaper
enforcement in arbitration, they may, in some cases, conclude that the
expected costs of judicial enforcement outweigh the total expected net
payoff from the deal. Basically, these contracting parties find
themselves in a similar predicament to that of "strangers," who, as we
noted above, face the choice between overpaying for adjudication and
having no legal means of protecting their interests. In some of these
cases, it is plausible to assume that the numbers will work out in favor
of pricey adjudication, but in other cases they may compel the parties
to forgo the deal altogether.
For example, suppose the parties expect that their investment
of $50 on one project will yield a total payoff of $100 if a court or
arbitrator enforces the contract terms, but only $40 if neither means
of enforcement is available. Suppose further that for court
enforcement, the parties' private litigation costs would be $35, the
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public cost would be $20, and the arbitration cost would be $25.
Finally assume that predispute contracting to specify arbitration
would cost them $30. In this scenario, the parties would not spend $30
to save either $10 in litigation cost ($35 for court enforcement - $25 for
arbitration enforcement) or even $25 in net profit after suit ($100 from
arbitration enforcement - $50 project investment - $25 litigation cost).
Hence they would face the difficult choice between judicial
enforcement and no law enforcement. In the absence of a user fee, the
parties would exercise their default option of suit because, while they
would incur $35 in private litigation costs, the commitment to sue
would preserve expected net profit of $15 ($100 if court enforcement $50 project investment - $35 litigation cost). However, if they were
charged the $20 user fee, total costs would exceed the expected net
value of litigation, leading the parties to forgo suit and-lacking
alternative means of enforcing the contract-to abandon the project
altogether. 62 Of course, the parties could negotiate and conclude a
postdispute agreement (for example, by contracting after suit
commences) to arbitrate their contract claim and save the $10 extra
cost of litigating their claim in court. Once the dispute arises,
however, the parties' relative advantage in court and arbitration may
vary given factual and legal attributes of the actual claim, so their
preferences for adjudication versus arbitration may also have changed
from what they were ex ante. Moreover, the parties may also inflate
bargaining costs in fighting over splitting the $10 saving from opting
for arbitration. Thus, while postdispute contracts for "alternative
dispute resolution" provide a realistic option, these contracts are
63
infrequently used due to bargaining costs and strategic obstacles.
Presuming the option of postdispute contract will be prohibitively
expensive in some fraction of cases, we set it aside to focus on the
problem at hand: applying the user fee when the parties could not
practically avoid litigating their contract case in court.
We surmise that such problematic cases are likely to arise in a
negligible fraction of commercial-contract situations. To begin with, a
large number of litigable disputes involve large-scale projects or joint
ventures in which the parties plainly possess the necessary

62. The $55 total cost of litigation ($35 litigation cost plus $20 user fee) yields $50 net
contract-enforcement value ($100 if court enforcement - $50 project investment), rendering the
suit, and consequently the project ($40 if no court enforcement - $50 project investment)
uneconomical.
63. See Maurits Barendrecht & Berend R. De Vries, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss with
Sticky Defaults: Failureon the Market for Dispute Resolution Services? 7 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 83, 83 (2006) (discussing the psychological, strategic, and institutional costs of
negotiating a procedure to resolve an ongoing dispute).
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information, economic incentive, and practical means to negotiate and
conclude predispute contracts. Notable examples include contract
disputes over patent and other intellectual property joint ventures,
purchase and sale of commercial real estate or medical and other
professional partnerships, no-competition employment agreements,
corporate mergers and acquisitions, and other financial deals. Many
large-scale cases arise from joint-venture-related mass accidents, often
including claims for contribution. There is exceedingly little chance
that a contribution claim would qualify for exemption as it would be
rare that the party seeking contribution would have a sufficiently
"deep pocket" to bear disproportionate damages yet lack the strong
profit motive to specify its choice between court and arbitration in a
predispute contract. Coverage disputes between liability insurers or
between the insurers and their joint-venture insureds provide another
64
prime allocative example of mass-accident-spawned contract claims.
Similar to contribution claims, insurance-coverage disputes are an
endemic feature of complex mass-accident litigation and rival the
enormous amount of judicial resources consumed by the underlying
litigation. Often, the central factual and legal questions presented in
such litigation will be mooted by settlement in the underlying

litigation. 65
Again, the problem is not that predispute contracting is
uneconomical. Although there may be many such situations, there is
good reason to believe that predispute contracting is economical in the
vast majority of cases due to the low cost of arbitration. Generally,
contracting parties can readily and cheaply incorporate both relevant
industry practice and standardized, streamlined, and inexpensive

64. For examples from the Deepwater Horizon disaster asking for declaratory judgment
regarding the scope of Transocean's insurance policy based on reciprocal indemnity agreements

between BP and Transocean, see Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment at 4, No. 02009
(S.D. Tex. June 8, 2010); and Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Certain Underwriters at
Lloyd's London v. BP PLC, No.10-1823 (S.D. Tex. May 21, 2010). For examples from other mass
accident litigations, see Elger Mfg. Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 972 F.2d 805, 805 (7th Cir. 1992)
(interpreting the "trigger provision" for liability insurance coverage for product liability design
claims by thousands of homeowners against a nationwide manufacturer of plastic plumbing
systems); Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (reviewing
rights and obligations of parties under general liability policies issued to manufacturer of
thermal insulation products containing asbestos).
65. Cf. San Diego Navy Fed. Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc'y, 162 Cal. App. 3d 358, 361-74
(1984) (reviewing insurer's duty to provide independent counsel when divergent interests
between insurer and insured are brought about by terms of the coverage policy); Alan 0. Sykes,
Judicial Limitations on the Discretion of Liability Insurers to Settle or Litigate: An Economic
Critique, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1345, 1345-48 (1994) (exploring judicial constraints on an insurer's
discretion to reject settlement offers and the potential of rejected offers to lead to litigation that
results in a judgment in excess of both the settlement offer and policy limits).
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modes of arbitration into their contracts. 66 The pertinent information
will be supplied to the parties by their insurers, bankers, and trade
associations, as well as by their lawyers. Arbitration associations
supply information about the various arbitral options free of charge to
potential buyers. Sellers of insurance and financial products and
the
services also supply this information, which works to 6spread
7
market cost amongst those who actually purchase the good.
But even if many cases involve uneconomic predispute
contracting, we think that it is highly unlikely that a problematic case
will arise in which the prospect of a user fee determines the fate of a
potentially productive commercial project. The simple reason is that it
would be most unusual for the parties to sue over a commercialcontract matter involving stakes so small that charging the parties a
user fee would decide the fate of their project. Few such claims find
their way into court. The high private costs and risks of litigation see
to that.
Because these cases are likely to be few in number and to
present complex project- and litigation-specific questions, it is doubtful
that it would be cost effective for courts to conduct a factual inquiry to
identify problematic cases that qualify for exemption from the user
fee. We think that the best way to avoid this cost is to impose an
amount-in-controversy requirement, 68 such as that used in diversity
cases to allocate federal-court resources. 69 The amount in controversy
can be determined with little difficulty in most cases by simply
examining the damage allegations in the pleadings.7 0
66. THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 291 (3d ed. 2009).
67. See, e.g., Major Arbitration and Mediation Rules and ADR Programs, AM. ARB. ASS'N,
http://www.adr.org/commercialarbitration (last visited Sept. 24, 2011) (providing information on
institution's role in the dispute resolution process, such as designing and developing alternative
dispute resolution systems for various organizations).
68. However, it seems likely that legislation would have to establish an amount-incontroversy test.
69. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006) (setting the amount-in-controversy requirements for federal
diversity jurisdiction cases in the district courts at $75,000 and at $5 million for class actions
removed from state courts).
70. There may be some complicated cases. The most difficult would be those in which the
stakes involved in the particular dispute fall below the proposed amount-in-controversy
threshold, but the ruling would resolve questions of more general application to the parties'
contractual relationship. Thus, courts should go beyond the pleadings to examine the nature of
the transaction and the parties' businesses to determine whether the dispute arises from a
unique, one-off deal for both parties, such as the purchase and sale of a piece of property or small
business, or whether it arises as a part of a course of dealings or from one series of actual or
potential transactions, such that the value of the adjudication to either or both parties in the
aggregate exceeds the amount in controversy. For example, although less than the amount in
controversy may be involved in a particular dispute concerning a truck-leasing contract, the
requirement may be met by the aggregate value of resolving the dispute as applied to similar
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VI. CONCLUSION

In closing we offer additional comments on the design and
application of the proposed user fee. First, we underscore the general
warrant for applying the user fee to commercial contracts. By
eliminating the excessive incentive of contracting parties to litigate
commercial-contract cases in court, the user fee should lower the
average delay cost and thereby increase the average deterrence effect
across other types of civil cases. The main reason to apply the user fee
in commercial-contract cases and not in other types of civil actions is
that, in the former, contracting parties possess the practical means as
well as the strong motivation to minimize total costs of the project
through optimal contract terms governing price, performance, and
resolution of potential disputes. 71 These contracts consequently
minimize total social costs (except for the overconsumption of judicial
resources). In other types of civil cases, parties lacking access to
judicially enforced civil liability would not be similarly situated to
72
minimize the sum of social costs from accident risk and use of courts.
Second, while we suggested the possibility that a certain class
of commercial-contract claims might be exempted from the user fee,
we emphasized that there is no empirical evidence suggesting the
need for such an exemption. As we explained, the problematic contract
cases require the unlikely confluence of two key factors: the deals
pending or potential disputes. However, we conjecture that courts will incur little cost to conduct
such inquiry. By the time the user fee is assessed at the close of the case, the courts will usually
be able to apply information they have already acquired and examined for other purposes, such
as in reviewing discovery, affidavits, and other party submissions to decide dispositive motions
and the like.
71. See Johnson & Matherne, supra note 10, at 86 (stating that defense, indemnity, and
insurance obligations are common in oil industry contracts in the Gulf of Mexico).
72. Indeed, in many "contract" cases, the parties are not effectively motivated to minimize
the total social costs of the deal. Although the seller usually is a commercial party, we do not
extend the scope of our proposal to the typical consumer goods contract. The principal reason is
that the disparity in information between the individual consumer and the commercial seller is
likely to prevent the parties from reaching a privately and socially optimal arrangement
regarding the terms governing the choice between judicial and arbitral resolution of disputes.
Despite competition pressures, the seller is apt to promulgate a one-sided standard form contract
in its favor regarding predispute terms. See Jaime Dodge & David Rosenberg, Collective
Adjudication of FinancialServices and Other Cross-Border Mass Injury Cases, 2010 EUR. J.
CONSUMER L. 141, 172-76. The widespread use of arbitration clauses that bar class actions is
evidence of the socially undesirable nature of these contracts. Such anti-class-action clauses vest
the seller with superior litigation power over the consumer and thereby not only skew the
outcome of disputes in its direction but also disable arbitrators from investing optimally in
deciding the common questions in dispute. Id. at 145-53. It is troubling that in the recent
decision of AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011), enforcing arbitration
provisions that bar class actions, neither the majority nor the dissenting opinion addressed the
biasing effects of such clauses.
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must involve a relatively high risk of contract breach and a low
margin of profit. The exemption might be justified, depending on
administrative cost, if these conditions obtained to such an extent that
the contracting parties (1) could not afford the costs of either
incorporating an arbitration clause into their contract or paying the
user fee for adjudication and therefore lacked the means to legally
enforce the contract; and consequently (2) would be compelled to forgo
their project altogether. Assuming that it might be necessary and
worthwhile for society to promote such projects by publicly subsidizing
the adjudication of related contract disputes, we recommended
adopting an amount-in-controversy test set at a very low dollar
threshold to counter the incentive of contracting parties to game the
exemption or simply to overinvest in litigating claims in court. To
avoid such contract disputes consuming high-priced judicial services,
we suggest assigning exempted cases to lower-priced specialized or
73
small-claims courts.
Third, some additional observations about the scope of the
waiver are in order. In commercial-contract cases, most of the legal
questions relate to "default rules" that courts establish to fill gaps,
clarify terms, and provide other content that parties would probably
prefer, but that would entail substantial costs for them to negotiate
and specify in their contracts.7 4 However, unlike legal precedents in
regulatory cases that are legally binding, default rules are only
presumptively binding. Contracting parties can freely accept or reject
judicially proffered default rules according to their determination of
how useful and costly it would be for them to customize their
arrangement. Moreover, to a large extent, trade associations, book
publishers, lawyers, arbitrators, and other nonjudicial sources devise
and supply optional default rules. As such, why should the public
subsidize the courts that make these rules? The best explanation is
that default rules, as a species of precedent, provide a public good that
litigants would often invest too little in producing in the absence of the
73. In very small contract claim cases, the extent of the public subsidy for adjudication is
open to empirical question. Essentially, the taxes businesses pay to fund courts can be viewed as
the premium for public insurance covering some "average" amount of adjudicative services in the
event a contractual dispute arises. Thus, even absent a user fee, consumption of judicial
resources is not completely subsidized because business taxes help pay for judicial resources.
Payment of such an ex ante tax might support exempting cases of the problematic sort described
above. Of course, litigants in these cases would have an incentive to overuse courts so levying a
user fee would still be necessary to prevent excessive consumption of judicial resources.
74. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 89-92 (1989) (commenting that default rules are rules
that parties would have negotiated if the costs of negotiating every contingency were sufficiently
low).
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subsidy. However, arbitration is a close substitute for courts in
making default rules, particularly in major areas of business that are
organized on the basis of specialized, technically sophisticated
knowledge and industry-specific customs and practices. But this
argument overlooks the regulatory dimension of judicially created
default rules. Courts fashion default rules not only to save private
contracting costs. These relatively standardized rules together with
canons of contract construction are also designed to avoid unnecessary
expenditure of judicial resources on interpretation and enforcement of
contracts. Essentially, these public "adjudicative" savings are passed
through to the contracting parties in lower user fees and other
litigation expenses, hence lowering total project costs. In short,
exempting default rulemaking from the user fee produces combined
private and judicial cost savings that outweigh the public cost of the
75
subsidy.
Finally, as we have explained, in motivating the contracting
parties to arbitrate more commercial-contract cases, the user fee will
open up space on dockets to enable speedier access to courts for the
other types of civil cases. Reducing delay costs for such cases may well
increase the rate and volume of their litigation. Consequently, court
congestion is likely to remain constant notwithstanding the
application of the user fee. 76 Solving the problem of court congestion
will take more than a user fee. For example, whole classes of litigation
must be removed from judicial purview (e.g., by adopting a no-fault
insurance regime for automobile accidents), and the substantive and
procedural elements of liability in many areas must be modified (e.g.,
by expanding use of consumer-contract class actions). Despite its
limits, however, making contracting parties pay for adjudication of
their commercial-contract disputes will redirect a significant amount
of judicial resources to higher and better social uses.

75. In clarifying the scope of the waiver provision, we emphasize that one type of legal
question in contribution cases should not benefit from publicly subsidized adjudication
regardless of its substantiality. As we previously noted, contribution cases may raise questions of
law that were presented but mooted by settlement in the underlying litigation between plaintiffs
and (some or all of) the joint venturers. While these legal questions are real, relevant, and

necessary to adjudicating the contribution case, the parties have incentives to collusively seek a
mutually beneficial ruling that adversely affects potential plaintiffs-plaintiffs who the present
contribution litigants, as repeat players, may contemplate facing in future cases.
76. See Priest, supra note 34, at 529-30 (noting that the adoption of more sophisticated
settlement methods, such as Alternative Dispute Resolution, seems to have little effect on court
congestion).

